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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

BILLY ARELLANO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970347-CA

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance within
a correctional facility, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(c) (1996). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1997).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Was circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that defendant's
possession of an envelope containing cocaine was knowing and intentional? "When
a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, [an appellate court] reviews the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury. [An appellate court will] reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive

or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v.
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see also State v. Burk.
839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
2. Did the prosecutor's lack of strict compliance with a statutory notice
provision mandate a continuance or exclusion of expert testimony "as a matter of
law" where defendant failed to show prejudice? The decision to grant or deny a
continuance or exclude testimony for failure to comply with discovery obligations is
reviewed for "clear abuse of discretion." State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah
App. 1997) (citing State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and (2)(c) (1996):
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess . . . a controlled substance.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while
inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional
facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of
confinement [is guilty of a second degree felony].
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1)(a), (l)(b), and (3) (1995):
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to
testify in a felony case at trial. . . , the party intending to call the expert
shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less
than 30 days before t r i a l . . . . Notice shall include the name and address
of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's
report.
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(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the
proposed testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report
does not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's
proposed testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of
that opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide the
opposing party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet
the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert
when available. . . .
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a
continuance of the trial. . . sufficient to allow preparation to meet the
testimony. If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is
the result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall
impose appropriate sanctions.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to
the defense upon request the following material or information of which
he has knowledge: . . .
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendant; . . .
(5) any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made available
to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to
plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. . . .
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought
to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this
rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances.
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Utah R. Evid. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, was charged with possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine) within a correctional facility, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (1996) (R. 8-9). He was convicted by a
jury, sentenced to serve one-to-fifteen years in prison (consecutively with his prior
term), and given credit for time served (R. 72, 98). He timely appealed (R. 99-100).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Point I - Offense2
Defendant was on the receiving end of a drug drop from another inmate.

1

The pleadings file in this case covers R. 1-117. The clerk numbered the cover
pages of the two volumes of trial transcript 118 and 119 respectively, but did not
independently number the succeeding pages in each volume. See Utah R. App. P.
11(b)(2)(A). Therefore, following the convention used in defendant's brief, pages of
trial transcript will be cited in this brief as R. 118 or R. 119, with the internal page
numbers of the respective volume following in brackets, e.g.. "R. 118 [27-28]."
2

As defense counsel conceded at trial, the essential facts regarding the offense
are not in dispute (R. 119 [94]; cf. Def. Br. at 10). What defendant disputes are the
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. Under well-settled law,
this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
Proper application of this principle is central to resolving defendant's insufficiency
claim.
4

Defendant and his codefendant were on a food detail serving dinner to inmates in
their cells (R. 118 [7, 18]; 119 [95-96, 120-121]). There were only three other inmates
on the food detail outside their cells at the time: two inmates under guard counting
meals in the "servery", and one inmate, like defendant and codefendant, who was
taking food from the "servery" to inmates in their cells (R. 118 [41, 53, 55-57, 69]; see
State's Exhibit 8, addendum G).3
Defendant and his codefendant were housed in different sections of the prison
(R. 118 [18, 20-23, 50]; 119 [125, 138-139]; see State's Exhibits l 4 and 7 [addendum
F], and Defendant's Exhibit 12). The codefendant was taking food from the guarded
"servery" to his section of the prison, and defendant and another inmate were serving
food in their section (R. 118 [17-19, 21]).
To move food from the common "servery" to the cells in their respective
sections, the inmates had to cross a multi-purpose room where three guards were eating
their dinner (R. 118 [19, 61]; State's Exhibits 1, 2 [addendum A], and 4 [addendum
C], and Defendant's Exhibit 12). From mere, they had to enter a central glassed-in
area known as the "Sally Port" (R. 118 [14, 21-23, 27, 34-35, 68-69]; State's Exhibits

3

Color copies of Exhibits 2-8, and 11 are at addenda A through H,
respectively.
4

A black and white photocopy of a portion of State's Exhibit 1 (a diagram of the
prison) is at addendum I.
5

1, 5 [addendum D], and 6 [addendum E], and Defendant's Exhibit 12). Inmates on
the food detail were allowed to enter the "Sally Port" unescorted (R. 118 [72]).
In the middle of the "Sally Port" was a control room, with windows extending
above four waist-high cinder block walls, manned by a guard sitting in a high-backed
chair at a control panel facing the three sections that housed inmates (R. 118 [14-16,
31-32]). The seated guard's back was toward the entrance to the "Sally Port" used by
inmates coming from the "servery." IdL In addition, paper was taped on the windows
in the corner of the control room closest to that entrance to provide some privacy for
persons using the control room toilet (R. 118 [33-34]; State's Exhibit 3 [addendum
B]). On the floor in the corresponding corner of the "Sally Port" outside the control
room there was a metal book depository (R. 118 [31, 37]; see State's Exhibits 1, 3
[addendum H], 5-6, and 11, and Defendant's Exhibit 12). Although the multi-purpose
room was lighted, the "Sally Port" itself was not (R. 118 [35]). This was by design to
create a kind of light barrier so that inmates could not see easily into the control room.
Id. Reflections off the glass could also make it difficult for guards in the multi-purpose
room to see clearly into the "Sally Port" itself (see State's Exhibits 5 and 6).
The three guards who were eating dinner in the multi-purpose room always sat at
the same table, the one farthest from the entrance to the "Sally Port" (R. 118 [19-20];
State's Exhibits 1, 2, and 4). Nevertheless, as the codefendant pushed a food cart from
the multi-purpose room into the entrance of the "Sally Port," one of the guards
6

observed codefendant turn, take an envelope from his pocket, slide it down the side of
his body, and drop it on the floor in the comer of the "Sally Port" near the book
depository (R. 118 [21-23, 50, 70]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 11).
Defendant, following immediately behind the codefendant, had already aroused
the guard's suspicion (R.118 [45, 47, 68-70]). Normally inmates on the food detail
either carried a two-handled coffee container or placed it on a food cart to take to the
inmates in their cells (R. 118 [25, 28]; sge State's Exhibit 2). Even when full, the
coffee container weighs no more than 30 pounds and is easily carried (R. 118 [28, 55,
70-71]; see State's Exhibit 2). Despite this, the guard observed defendant place the
coffee container on the floor as he left the "servery" (R. 118 [25, 27, 69]; see State's
Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8). Defendant then bent over the container and began to slide it
across the floor. IcL
Defendant entered the "Sally Port," still bent over the coffee container, shortly
after codefendant dropped the envelope (R. 118 [45, 68-69]). Defendant slid the coffee
container toward the envelope, picked up the envelope, and continued to slide the
container toward the entrance to the section where he was housed (R. 118 [26, 28-29];
see State's Exhibits 1 and 11, and Defendant's Exhibit 12).
When the guard at the table in the multi-purpose room observed defendant pick
up the envelope, he contacted the guard in the control room by intercom (R. 118 [29,
45-46]; 119 [120-121]). When the control room guard told defendant to return to the
7

multi-purpose room, defendant left the coffee container next to the book depository,
stood up, and dropped the envelope on the floor beside it (R. 118 [30]; 119 [104-106];
see State's Exhibits 1 and 11). A guard immediately recovered the envelope (R. 119
[99]).
The unmarked sealed envelope was an "indigent" envelope commonly issued to
inmates (R. 118 [51]; 119 [99-102, 113]; see Defendant's Exhibits 13 and 14). It
contained a small folded-up piece of inmate writing paper (R. 119 [101-103, 125-126];
State's Exhibit 15). Inside the folded paper was a small piece of twist-tied plastic that
contained a quantity of cocaine (R. 119 [127, 130-131, 147-159, 163-166]; State's
Exhibits 15, 16, and 18).
Point II - Expert Witness Notice Issue
Based on a prison field test, defendant was initially charged with possession of
methamphetamine (R. 8-9; cL R. 119 [127-128]). The charge was later amended,
changing "methamphetamine" to "cocaine", based on subsequent State Crime Lab
testing (R. 8-9; R. 119 [20-22]). At defendant's November 7, 1996 preliminary
hearing, a crime lab report identifying the chemist who tested the substance and
concluded that it was cocaine, was admitted over defendant's hearsay objections (R. 3;
R. 119 [17-19, 21]; State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing], addendum J; cf State's
Exhibit 18 [trial]).

8

On the morning of January 17, 1997, five days before trial, the prosecutor
notified defense counsel by phone that the State intended to call the chemist, Ms.
Jennifer McNair, as a witness at trial (R. 119 [23]). Although defendant subsequently
filed two pretrial motions in limine (R. 21-24), he did not move for a continuance or
for exclusion of Ms. McNair's testimony until after the jury had been called, and the
trial court had resolved all previous written motions on January 22, 1997, the morning
of the first day of trial (R. 119 [3-16, 22]).5
In support of his oral motion for a continuance or exclusion of the chemist's
testimony, defendant argued that Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995) requires 30 days'
notice that an expert is expected to testify, a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae, and
the opinion and basis for the opinion before an expert can testify, and that the State's
failure to strictly comply entitled defendant to a continuance or exclusion of the
chemist's testimony (R. 119 [16]). In response to the trial court's question, defense
counsel acknowledged that Ms. McNair's testimony would be that the substance she
tested was cocaine (R. 119 [17]).
While admitting he did not provide defendant with Ms. McNair's curriculum
vitae, the prosecutor argued that defendant was on notice as to her identity and the
substance of her testimony based on the report admitted at the preliminary hearing more

5

Defendant's oral motion, argument by the parties, and the trial court's ruling
are at addendum K.
9

than two months before (R. 119 [17-18]). He also argued that defense counsel knew
that, unless defendant stipulated to admission of the report at trial, the State would be
required to call the chemist to testify about the test and its results (R. 119 [21]; see
Utah R. Evid. 901(a) and (b)(1)). Thus, the prosecutor argued, defendant had the duty
to prepare to meet the chemist's testimony and had ample time to do so regardless of
whether he received her curriculum vitae or actual notice of her testimony pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (R. 119 [17, 23]). The prosecutor concluded that the real
issue was not whether defendant had received explicit statutory notice, but whether
defendant had been prejudiced, and that the appropriate remedy, if there were
prejudice, would be a continuance rather than exclusion of the testimony (R. 119 [18]).
Defense counsel responded that "it doesn't matter whether we're prejudiced
under the statute, there's no mention of that. But we should be allowed to get these
reports, and the basis for the opinion, which is not in the toxicology report, and be able
to hire an expert to rebut that if we feel that there is a need to" (R. 119 [19]).
The trial court asked if defense counsel believed she needed to hire an expert (R.
119 [20]). Defense counsel responded that there was a discrepancy between the color
of what was field tested at the prison and what was later tested at the crime lab, and
that she did not know the chemist's qualifications. IcL! The prosecutor replied that any
6

Although defendant argued the chain of custody issue to the jury at trial (see R.
119 [211-213]), he has not raised the issue on appeal nor has he contested that the
substance in the envelope was cocaine.
10

chain of custody issue was unrelated to the expert's testimony, and that the chemist's
background was nothing new to defense counsel (R. 119 [21, 18]).
The trial court denied defendant's motions for a continuance or exclusion of the
Ms. McNair's testimony, but allowed her testimony f,only as to the test made as far as
it being a controlled substance and what it is" (R. 119 [22]). The trial court also
stated it would allow defendant to bring in evidence about a discrepancy in the color of
the substance, and evidence about the prior field test. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I. Circumstantial evidence surrounding this prison drug drop was
sufficient to establish defendant's knowing and intentional possession of cocaine. The
timing, location, and method of transfer established a preplanned scheme, not an
innocent or coincidental event. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
the evidence and reasonable inferences are not so inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
Point II. The prosecutor failed to strictly comply with a statutory notice
provision by giving defendant 5 days' actual notice before trial that an expert would be
testifying, and by giving defendant the expert's curriculum vitae on the day of trial.
However, where defendant failed to show prejudice, the trial court was not required "as
a matter of law" to grant a continuance or exclude the expert testimony.

11

The State was required to prove as an element of the charged offense that the
substance defendant possessed was cocaine. Not less than two months before trial,
defendant received a copy of the toxicology report which provided written notice of the
name and address of the chemist who tested the substance and her conclusion that it
was cocaine. The plain language of the applicable statute says information provided by
the proponent of expert testimony must be "sufficient to give the opposing party
adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony." Defendant had ample time to
prepare to meet this testimony, testimony that is customary in any drug case where
there is no stipulation as to the identity of the drug. Indeed, this was the only evidence
that the substance defendant had possessed was cocaine. Because defendant failed to
establish prejudice, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a
continuance and to refuse to exclude the testimony.
ARGUMENT
Point I
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT'S POSSESSION OF COCAINE
WAS KNOWING AND INTENTIONAL
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine (Def. Br. at 12-25). In support of his
argument, defendant discusses at length selected federal authority (Def. Br. at 15-19)

12

which is not controlling, and is, in any event, inapposite.7 The issue is not whether
defendant possessed the envelope containing cocaine. The evidence is undisputed that
he did.8 The issue is whether his possession of cocaine was knowing and intentional.
Contrary to defendant's assertion (Def. Br. at 15), Utah case law does provide a
framework for analysis to differentiate between innocent and culpable possession.
Under Utah law, intent and knowledge must usually be inferred from a defendant's
conduct and surrounding circumstances. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah
1991); see also State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (intent may be
inferred from facts and circumstances surrounding crime); State v. Smith, 728 P.2d
1014 (Utah 1986) ("proof of guilty knowledge, like proof of intent, is usually
circumstantial") (citing Tageant v. State. 673 P.2d 651, 654 (Wyo. 1983)); State v.
Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990) ("intent need not be proved by direct
evidence, but may be inferred from defendant's conduct and surrounding
circumstances") (quoting State v. Davis. 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted)). Therefore, resolution of this issue depends on a proper review of the facts
and circumstances. Defendant's review is flawed since he views the evidence, and all
inferences, in favor of his innocence (see Def. Br. at 19-25).
7

Utah statutes define "possession" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (1996)
and 76-1-601(9) (1996), "knowing," and "intentional" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103
(1) and (2) (1974).
8

See n.2 and n.6, above.
13

Under well-settled law, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d
1201, 1205 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Viewed in that light, the evidence and
reasonable inferences are not so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. IdL The
timing, location, and method of transfer here established a preplanned scheme, not an
innocent or coincidental event. In short, defendant intentionally took possession of the
envelope, and later dropped it, under circumstances sufficient to establish that he knew
that it contained cocaine.
A. Timing. The timing of the transfer is significant because defendant and his
codefendant were housed in separate sections of the prison divided by cement walls (R.
118 [14-15, 18, 20-23, 44, 50]; 119 [125, 138-139]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 7, and
Defendant's Exhibit 12). But they worked together on a food detail taking dinner to
their respective sections from a common "servery" (R. 118 [7, 18]; 119 [95-96, 120121]). It was during the food detail that the codefendant dropped the envelope to begin
the transfer, with defendant a few steps behind him (R. 118 [21-23, 45, 50, 70]; see
Defendant's Exhibit 12). Given defendant's immediate proximity, it is reasonable to
infer that his codefendant intended to transfer the envelope and its contents to
defendant. Moreover, the appearance of merely going about their duties serving food
provided a good cover for their transaction.
14

B. Location, In addition to the timing of the transfer, the location is important
since it is the guards' duty to intercept contraband (R. 118 [5-8]), and since possessing
or transferring contraband can subject a prisoner to a strip search or an extended
lockdown in his or her cell (R. 118 [48-49, 71, 76, 107-108, 114-116]; 119 [122]).
Normally guards supervised inmates throughout the prison, in their sections,
whether in or out of their cells, while they were in the yard, during prisoner recreation,
and elsewhere (R. 118 [5, 7-8]). Even on the food detail, inmates were almost
constantly under guards' supervision.
The "servery," where two other inmates on the food detail were counting food
trays, was under guard (R. 118 [41, 53, 55-57, 69]; see State's Exhibit 8).
In the multi-purpose room (which defendant and codefendant had to cross to get
from the "servery" to the "Sally Port"), three guards were eating dinner at their
customary table, farthest from the entrance to the "Sally Port" (R. 118 [19-20, 61]; see
State's Exhibits 1, 2, and 4).
In the middle of the "Sally Port," there was a control room where a guard was
seated in a high-back chair with his back to the entrance from the multi-purpose room
(R. 118 [14-16, 31-32]). In addition to waist-high walls and the chair upon which he
was seated, the control room guard's view of the corner closest to that entrance was
obstructed by paper taped on the windows to provide some privacy for persons using
the control room toilet (R. 118 [33-34]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 3). In that same
15

corner of the "Sally Port," there was a metal book depository that could obstruct the
view of the guards who would be otherwise distracted eating their dinner in the far end
of the multi-purpose room (R. 118 [31, 37]; see State's Exhibits 1, 3, 5-6, and 11, and
Defendant's Exhibit 12). Paper taped on the window by the book depository, facing
section 1, could also obstruct the view of the inmates housed there (see State's Exhibit
11). And although the multi-purpose room was lighted, the "Sally Port" itself was not
(R. 118 [35]). Reflections off the glass could also make it difficult for guards in the
multi-purpose room and inmates in section 1 to see clearly into the "Sally Port" (Id.:
see State's Exhibits 5 and 6).
Not surprisingly, that is precisely where the codefendant chose to drop the
envelope: in the corner of the unlit "Sally Port" near the book depository (R. 118 [2123, 50, 70]; see State's Exhibits 1 and 11).
C. Method of transfer. Although timing and location are important, defendant's
own conduct, both before and after the transfer, and the coordinated conduct of his
codefendant, best establish that defendant knowingly and intentionally received the
cocaine from the codefendant as part of a preplanned scheme.
As the codefendant pushed a food cart into the entrance of the "Sally Port," he
turned, took the envelope from his pocket, slid it down his leg, and dropped it onto the
floor. He then continued to push the food cart to the entrance of his section (R. 118
[21-23, 50, 70]). Codefendant's actions all make clear that he intentionally but
16

surreptitiously dropped the envelope. It is reasonable to infer that he intended it to be
picked up by someone who followed. Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that when the
eodefendant turned just before dropping the envelope, he was looking to see that
defendant, the intended recipient, was close behind.
Defendant had already aroused suspicion by bending over and pushing an easilycarried coffee container along the floor from the "servery" to the corner of the "Sally
Port" (R. 118 [25-29, 45, 47, 68-70]; see State's Exhibit 2, and Statement of Facts, p.
7, above). If defendant had been carrying the coffee container, or rolling it on a food
cart, he would have had to bend over to pick up the envelope. Instead, already bent
over, he was able to easily retrieve the envelope and continue pushing the coffee
container toward the entrance to the section where he was housed (R. 118 [26, 28-29];
see State's Exhibits 1 and 11, and Defendant's Exhibit 12). It is therefore reasonable
to infer that when defendant first bent over and began pushing the coffee container, he
knew the envelope would be dropped, and intended to be in a position to pick it up
without attracting unnecessary attention.
It is notable that defendant did not stand up to examine the envelope to see what
it contained as an innocent person with no prior knowledge might do. Prison policy
required inmates to bring unknown items to the attention of prison staff (R. 119 [145]).
But defendant continued, bent over, to push the coffee container toward the entrance to
his section with the envelope in hand (R. 118 [26, 28-29]). It is therefore reasonable to
17

infer that defendant already knew what it contained, and intended to take it to his cell
or transfer it to another inmate while serving coffee in his section. In other words, his
possession was culpable, not innocent. Cf State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985)
("Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional possession"); Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (1996) ("it is sufficient if it is shown that. . . the
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the
person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it").
When confronted moments later by the guard in the control room, who had been
alerted via intercom by the observant guard in the multi-purpose room, defendant stood
up and immediately dropped the envelope before returning to the multi-purpose room
(R. 118 [30]; 119 [104-106]). Together with the other circumstances surrounding his
retrieval of the envelope, this only underscores defendant's guilty knowledge of what it
contained. See State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983) (admission by conduct
relevant as "constituting circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt"); State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) ("One of the circumstances traditionally used to
supply evidence of guilt is flight or concealment of the crime") (citing 2 Wigmore,
Evidence §§ 273, 276 (Chadbourn rev. 1979 & Supp. 1991); State v. Bales. 675 P.2d
573 (Utah 1983) (approving instruction that concealment of property may be evidence
of knowledge of the contraband nature of the property).
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Finally, contrary to defendant's factual assertions (Def. Br. at 21-22), it is
significant that the only other inmate who was outside his cell during the food detail,
but not under guard in the "servery" during the drop, was behind defendant carrying a
tray (R. 118 [55-56, 68-69]). He was in no position to stoop down easily and pick up
the envelope. This fact establishes again that defendant was the intended recipient, and
no one else.
In sum, the opportunistic timing and specific "blind spot" location of the
transfer, defendant's bent-over posture to push rather than carry the two-handled coffee
container from the "servery," his proximity immediately behind the codefendant when
the drop was made, his continued movement toward the entrance to the section where
he was housed after retrieving the envelope, and his immediate abandonment of the
envelope when confronted by a guard, are sufficient to establish that defendant's
possession of cocaine was knowing and intentional. Therefore, viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences are not
so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
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Point H
THE PROSECUTOR'S LACK OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH A
STATUTORY NOTICE PROVISION DID NOT MANDATE A
CONTINUANCE OR EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY "AS
A MATTER OF LAW" WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW
PREJUDICE
Defendant argues that he was entitled to a continuance or exclusion of expert
testimony "as a matter of law" where the prosecutor failed to strictly comply with a
statutory notice provision (Def. Br. at 25-39). Defendant's argument is undermined by
the acknowledgment in his own brief that, under the applicable standard of review,
such decisions are within the trial court's discretion (Def. Br. at 2 (citing State v.
Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997) (the decision f,lies within the broad
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb such a decision absent a clear abuse
of discretion")). It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a
continuance and refuse to exclude a chemist's testimony where defendant failed to show
prejudice. See Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530; see also Stevenson v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339
(Utah 1996) ("The trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the
admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this
court will not reverse" (citations omitted)).
The State was required to prove as an element of the charged offense that the
substance defendant possessed was cocaine (see R. 8-9, 73, 85).
Not later than his preliminary hearing on November 7, 1996, defendant had
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written notice through a State Crime Lab report of the name and address of the chemist
who tested the substance and concluded that it was cocaine (R. 3; R. 119 [17-19, 21];
State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing]; cf State's Exhibit 18 [trial]). In fact, the State
Crime Lab report was admitted at the preliminary hearing over defendant's hearsay
objections (R. 3, R. 119 [17-19, 21]). Therefore, unless defendant stipulated to
admission of the report at trial, it was clear from the date of his preliminary hearing
that the State would be required to call the chemist to testify about the test and its
results (see Utah R. Evid. 901(a) and (b)(1); 1101(b)(5)). Such testimony is customary
in any drug case where there is no stipulation. Indeed, the crime lab report was the
only evidence that the substance defendant had possessed was cocaine.
On the morning of January 17, 1997, five days before trial, the prosecutor orally
notified defendant that the State intended to call the chemist, Ms. Jennifer McNair, as a
witness at trial (R. 119 [23]). On January 22, 1997, after the jury had been called and
the trial court had resolved defendant's written motions on other matters, defendant
made an oral motion for a continuance, and then for exclusion of the chemist's
testimony (R. 119 [3-16, 22]). In support of his motion, defendant argued that he was
not required to establish prejudice under the notice statute, and implied that he was
entitled to the requested relief as a matter of law (R. 119 [19]). On appeal he has since
made that argument explicit (Def. Br. at 26-28), although he has argued prejudice in
the alternative (Def. Br. at 28-39). As noted above, the standard of review section of
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defendant's brief defeats his own "matter of law" argument. Def. Br. at 2 (citing
Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530). His assertions of prejudice will be addressed below.
The two grounds defendant asserted at trial for why he needed a continuance to
obtain his own expert were that (1) there was a discrepancy between the color of the
substance described at the prison, and reported at the Crime Lab, and (2) he did not
know the chemist's qualifications (R. 119 [20]). Neither of these grounds is sufficient
reason for a continuance to hire an expert witness.
First, as the prosecutor pointed out at trial, the chain of custody issue had
nothing to do with the chemist's testimony that the substance she tested was cocaine (R.
119 [20-22]). Indeed, with the trial court's explicit permission (R. 119 [22]), defendant
litigated the chain of custody issue at trial through other witnesses.9
Second, defendant acknowledged receiving Ms. McNair's resume the day of trial
(Def. Br. at 27) and reviewing it before trial (Def. Br. at 35). Ms. McNair was the
State's final witness (R. 119 [159]). During the brief recitation of her qualifications at
the beginning of her testimony (R. 119 [159-160]), defendant elected not to voir dire
her, nor has he challenged her qualifications on appeal.
Defendant acknowledged, in response to the trial court's question, that Ms.
McNair would testify that the substance she tested was cocaine (R. 199 [17]). As
already noted, defendant had notice of that fact and her identity more than two months
9

As already noted (n.6), defendant has opted not to pursue that issue on appeal.
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before trial (see R. 3; R. 119 [17-19, 21]; State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing]; cf
State's Exhibit 18 [trial]), and has not contested her conclusion on appeal.
The plain language of the applicable statute says information provided by the
proponent of expert testimony must be "sufficient to give the opposing party adequate
notice to prepare to meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(b) (1995)
(emphasis added). The statute requires "not less than 30 days" notice before trial
including "the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a
copy of the expert's report." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) (1995). But failure to
comply with these requirements only entitles the opposing party "to a continuance of
the trial. . . sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony " Utah Code Ann. §
77-17-13(3) (1995) (emphasis added). Defendant failed to establish that he did not
know the substance of the chemist's testimony or that a continuance was necessary to
meet that testimony. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
refuse to grant a continuance or to exclude the chemist's testimony.
In reviewing the denial of a defendant's request for a continuance or other relief,
this Court considers four factors:
(1) the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready his defense
prior to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a
continuance could have been met if the continuance had been granted; (3)
the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced
the court and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant
might have suffered harm as a result of the court's denial.
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Begishe. 937 P.2d at 530 (citing United States v. Flynt. 756 F.2d 1352, 1358-1359 (9th
Cir. 1985)) (emphasis in the original). The evidence discussed above will be reviewed
under each of these factors in turn.
A. Defendant's diligence in preparing for trial. Defendant had more than two
months, from the date of his preliminary hearing, to prepare to address the crime lab
report which was the State's only evidence that the substance he had possessed was
cocaine. In contrast to Begishe, 937 P.2d at 528, where the prosecutor surprised the
defendant with an incriminating report from a test conducted on the afternoon of the
first day of trial, defendant here had more than two months to hire his own expert or
request a retest before trial. But defendant waited until 5 days after express notice the
expert would testify and until after the jury was called to raise his oral motion for a
continuance or exclusion of the testimony. As the trial court correctly concluded,
defendant "had plenty of opportunity to bring [a motion] to this Court's attention" (R.
119 [22]). Defendant obviously did not intend to stipulate to admission of the crime lab
report: he had objected to its admission at his preliminary hearing. His complaint at
trial about a lack of notice that the chemist who authored the report would testify was
therefore disingenuous (see Utah R. Evid. 901(a) and (b)(1)).
B. Likelihood continuance would have met defendant's need. Defendant failed
to establish at trial any legitimate need for a continuance. When asked by the trial
court why he needed a continuance to hire an expert, when he had not hired an expert
24

before, defendant proffered that an expert could help to challenge the chain of custody
and because he was unaware of the chemist's qualifications. In denying defendant's
motion, the trial court expressly permitted defendant to present evidence about any
potential discrepancy in the chain of custody and results of the field test (R. 119 [22]).
Again, defendant has not contested these issues on appeal nor contested the chemist's
qualifications to render the opinion she did. As the moving party, defendant had the
burden to establish the legitimate need for a continuance. See State v. Wodskow. 896
P.2d 29, n.5 (Utah App. 1995). Defendant failed to meet that burden.
C. Inconvenience to the court and the State. The trial had been set, pretrial
proceedings had begun, and the jury was standing by. Defendant's oral motion was the
last thing he raised in pretrial proceedings the morning of trial before the jury was
called into the courtroom (R. 119 [16-24]). The State expressed that it was "prepared
and ready to go" (R. 119 [18]). In denying defendant's motion, the trial court noted
that it had already "reserved the time and called the jury in on this matter" (R. 119
[22]). Defendant has provided no legitimate reason for why the trial court, the jury,
and the State should have been inconvenienced by a delay.
D. Extent to which defense might have been harmed as a result. This Court
calls this "the most important among the factors." Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531.
Defendant argued that a chain of custody issue and the chemist's qualifications were
reasons to justify a delay at trial. But he has contested neither on appeal. Instead,
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defendant argues for the first time on appeal that M[e]xpert testimony verifying the
minute quantity [of powder in the envelope] and cross-examination of McNair would
explain to the jury the unlikelihood that [defendant] would recognize the small amount
in the sealed envelope and undercut the State's theory that [he] was involved in a drug
transaction" (Def. Br. at 38-39). Defendant fails to explain what an expert could have
added to the lay testimony of the guard who retrieved the envelope: that he had to hold
it up to the light and feel it before he could determine there was something in it (R. 119
[100, 113]). In addition, the guard who opened the sealed envelope testified he had to
unwrap a piece of folded paper to ultimately determine that it contained drugs (R. 119
[126-127]). Defense counsel repeatedly highlighted this evidence during closing
argument (see R. 119 [213, 216, 218-219]). But even with this eyewitness testimony
and argument before it, the jury rejected the underlying premise that was central to
defendant's theory: that he did not know what was in the envelope when he picked it
up. His belated and conclusory argument fails to establish how his own expert could
have changed this. In short, defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced at
trial.10
10

In Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531 n.5, this Court wrote:

Because appellant has successfully demonstrated prejudice in any event, it
is not necessary for us to definitively decide who ultimately has the
burden to show prejudice or lack of prejudice when there has been a
violation of section 77-17-13. CJL State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 921
(Utah 1987) (stating, in context of Rule 16(a)(5) violation, that "when the
26

Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a
continuance and to refuse to exclude the chemist's testimony.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _2/yf~day of January, 1998.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

BARNARD N. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General

defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have
impaired the defense, it is up to the State to persuade the court that there
is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of trial
would have been more favorable for the defendant").
Where, as here, defendant completely failed to demonstrate prejudice at the trial level,
it is likewise unnecessary for this Court to definitively decide who ultimately bears the
burden on appeal. However, where defendant was the moving party and failed to
prevail below, his burden should not be shifted to the State on appeal.
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Addendum A
(State's Exhibit 2, photograph of the coffee container defendant bent over
and pushed across the floor)
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Addendum B
(State's Exhibit 3, photograph showing paper taped in the corner window
of the control room)

Addendum C
(State's Exhibit 4, photograph showing tables in the multi-purpose room)

Addendum D
(State's Exhibit 5, photograph showing the "Sally Port" area, the control room,
and reflections off the windows)

Addendum £
(State's Exhibit 6, photograph showing a view from the multi-purpose room
toward the " Sally Port" and the control room)

'4
f

Addendum F
(State's Exhibit 7, photograph of one of the sections housing inmates)
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Addendum G
(State's Exhibit 8, photograph of the entrance to the "servery")
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Addendum H
(State's Exhibit 11, photograph showing the book depository in the corner of
the "Sally Port," and paper taped on the window facing section 1)
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Addendum I
(Photocopy of a portion of State's Exhibit 1, a diagram of the prison,
showing marks and labels by witnesses)

Addendum J
(State's Exhibit 1 [preliminary hearing], the State Crime Lab report)
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Addendum K
(R. 119 [16-23]; Defendant's motion, the parties' argument,
and the trial court's ruling]

1

something because he was fearful of what might take

2 1 place.
3

But I will not allow anything as to what has

taken place as a result of this case.

41

MR. CASTLE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

5I

MS. BOWMAN:

I had one other problem, one

61

other motion.

I received a notice on Friday that

7

Mr. Castle intends to call a criminalist from the State

8 1 Crime Lab, and apparently intends to introduce expert
9

testimony.

10

As you're aware, Your Honor, 77-17-13, the

111

state is required to give 30 days' notice, a copy of

12

the curriculum vitae, and the opinion and the basis for

13

that opinion.

14

It's clearly expert testimony, and obviously a

15I

lay person can't testify that it is or is not cocaine.

161

That particular statute indicates that if the

17|

defense —

18

requirements of the section, the opposing party shall

19

be entitled to a continuance.

20

or, the prosecution fails to meet the

So I think that that is the first remedy.

It

211

also allows you to impose whatever sanctions you wish

22

or feel are appropriate.

231

sanctions would be to exclude this testimony.

24|
251

I feel that appropriate

The state has known about this from the filing
of the case.

They clearly should have given us this

16

ll

written information 3 0 days prior to the trial, instead

2

of a phone message this past Friday.

3

I would move to exclude the testimony of the

4 1 expert witness from the State Crime Lab.
5

THE COURT:

What's the expert witness going to

6

testify to; as to the substance, the substance is

71

cocaine?

8I

MS. BOWMAN:

Yes.

9

MR. CASTLE:

I'd like to respond, if I could,

10

to back up.

Ill
121
13I
14
15

THE COURT:

Let me say —

is that what you're

saying?
MS. BOWMAN:

That's what I believe the state's

intending to do.
MR. CASTLE:

If we can back up to the time of

161

the preliminary hearing, Your Honor, which was months

171

ago, we had a preliminary hearing, and the expert

181

witnesses, the toxicology report, was provided to

19I

Ms. Bowman at that time.

201

The toxicology report was offered into

21

evidence at that time identifying Jennifer McNair as

221

the criminalist.

23

Her testimony is contained in that report.

241

Ms. Bowman knows that.

With respect to her curriculum

25

vitae, it's true that I didn't provide that, but this

17

1

is the type of case that Ms. Bowman thoroughly familiar

2

with when it comes to the testimony of a criminalist,

3

saying that this substance in fact was a controlled

4 1 substance.
5I

We have a lot of drug cases, and the question

6

that I think needs to be addressed is:

7

prejudiced as a result of that?

8
9
101
Ill

Has she been

And sanctions, it certainly isn't to exclude
the evidence at this point, because her motion is
untimely.
If she was worried about that, she should have

12

filed the motion before now.

13

if you feel that it's prejudicial to her and her

14

client, is to continue this case to another date.

151

state is prepared and ready to go.

16

The appropriate sanction,

The

Ms. McNair's testimony, and her background, is

17

not going to be anything new to Ms. Bowman, and it's

18

not something that has not been covered by other

19 1 criminalists.

She's simply going to testify that she

201

has a degree in chemistry and that she works at the

211

Crime Lab, and has for the last couple of years, and

22

her job is to test what are suspected controlled

23 J substances, and that as a result of her training and
241

her experience, she's going to testify that this

25

substance is cocaine.

18

1

MS, BOWMAN:

Your Honor, that report was

2

allowed at the preliminary hearing over my objection.

3

The report is inconsistent with the field test

4 1 performed by the prison, and the report is in the
51

police records in this case.

61

This is not a routine case where everybody

7

finds the same drugs or the same quantities.

There are

81

discrepancies between what was reported at the prison

9 1 and the report that was allowed at the preliminary
10
11

hearing.
Furthermore, part of the purpose of the

121

statute is to allow us to hire an expert to rebut any

13

testimony, but we don't have the resources to go hire

141

an expert for every single report we get.

15

We expect notice from the state under this

16

statute, and they likewise expect it from us if we're

17

going to hire an expert or obtain or use an expert to

18

testify about something.

19

Clearly, expert testimony fits within the

201

statute, and it doesn't matter whether we're prejudiced

21

under the statute, there's no mention of that.

221

should be allowed to get these reports, and the basis

231

for the opinion, which is not in the toxicology report,

24I

and be able to hire an expert to rebut that if we feel

25

that there is a need to.

But we

19

l]

We don't have resources to go hire an expert

21

right and left, based upon every toxicology report in

3

every single drug case.

41
5

THE COURT:

Has anything led you to believe

that you need to hire an expert to rebut that?

61

MS. BOWMAN:

Yes, Your Honor.

There is a

7

discrepancy between what was found at the prison and

8

what was field-tested at the prison when the prison

9

supposedly had experts out there doing it, according to

101

other officers, who claimed that this lieutenant was

11

very well trained in giving field tests.

12

And the discrepancy is that the color of the

131

substance is different when it was found at the prison,

14

difference from what is reported in the toxicology

15

report.

16

And as in any chemistry matter, the color of

17

the unknown substance is critical in analysis.

18

don't have any report about that.

19

mentioned in the state crime lab, that the substance is

20

white.

21

It is simply

All of the prison records report it as

221

yellowish or yellowish-white or creme.

23I

the same substance.

24

don't know what her qualifications are.

25

We

MR. CASTLE:

It may not be

I don't know what was tested.

I

Your Honor, with respect to the

20

II

color of the substance, whether the right substance was

21

tested, that's an issue of chain*

3

issue to become chain.

4

chain of custody, different drugs, how they got to the

5

prison.

6I

I don # t want the

I don't want the issue to be

M s . Bowman has known at the preliminary

7

hearing that we submitted the toxicology report that

8]

was allowed under the reliable hearsay provision.

9

knew that there was an expert there.

She

She knows, and

101

for many years she's practiced law, that unless she's

11

stipulating to that report, I have to bring in the

121

criminalist to testify about the drugs and with respect

13

to the field test.

141

I find it sort of curious that M s . Bowman now

151

is relying on the field test, because most drug cases,

16

if we try to get the field test in, they're objecting

17

saying that the field test is unreliable, and the

18

person who tested the drugs was not a criminalist, not

19

a chemist.

20I
21

She simply used one of those nick tests to
determine what —

.

22

MS. BOWMAN:

And I object to that.

231

MR. CASTLE:

To determine what the substance

24

is.

And the substance that the field test —

251

provides a presumption of what it is.

it only

And in talking

21

I
1

with the officers, they indicated to me that what

21

they're trying to establish was that it was a

31

controlled substance.

4I
51
6

And that's why M s . McNair's testimony is
important, because she's the one qualified to test it.
THE COURT:

Okay, Counsel.

The Court is going

71

to do this:

The Court is going to deny the defendant's

81

motion, first of all, as far as a continuance is

91

concerned; that the Court has been in contact with both

10

counsel in this case, and they've had plenty of

11
12

opportunity to bring to this Court's attention if you
were going to raise this before.

13

This Court has reserved the time and called

14

the jury in on this matter.

151

you were derelict in that particular action as far as a

16

continuance.

17

The Court thinks both of

As far as the evidence is concerned, the Court

181

is going to allow the expert to testify only as to the

19

test made as far as it being a controlled substance and

20

what it is.

21

The Court will allow any testimony from the

22I

defense as far as any color of substance.

If she

231

wishes to bring in testimony as far as the field test

24

was concerned at the prison, which may be in

25

controversy to it, the Court will allow that testimony.

22

MS. BOWMAN:

1

Could we clarify for the record

1

2

that the first notice I received from Mr. Castle about

1

3

calling this criminalist was January the 17th, the

J

4

message at 10:50?

1

5

he spoke to my secretary.

I did not speak directly to him, but

1

6

And the state criminalist is not listed as a

7

witness in the information, and was not called at the

8

preliminary hearing to clarify that.
THE COURT:

9'
10

MR. CASTLE:
understanding.

Is that your understanding,

1

Your Honor, that is my

1

She was not called as a witness.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CASTLE:

15'

THE COURT:

16

1

Mr. Castle?

11
12

1

1

Yes or no.

1

I'm sorry?
Was that your understanding?

Yes

or no.

I
1

17

MR. CASTLE:

1 8

THE COURT:

19

MS. BOWMAN:

20

THE COURT:

Yes.
Thank you.

1
And anything else?

J

No, Your Honor.

1

Okay.

21'

(Whereupon, the in camera proceedings

1

22

came to a close; after which, the

1

23

following proceedings continued in the

1

24 1

presence and hearing of jury panel and

1

25

defendant:)
23

